Bernard et al. (2015) study an optimal insurance design problem where an individual's preference is of the rank-dependent utility (RDU) type, and show that in general an optimal contract covers both large and small losses. However, their results suffer from the unrealistic assumption that the random loss has no atom, as well as a problem of moral hazard for paying more compensation for a smaller loss. This paper addresses these setbacks by removing the non-atomic assumption, and by exogenously imposing the constraint that both the indemnity function and the insured's retention function be increasing with respect to the loss. We characterize the optimal solutions via calculus of variations, and then apply the result to obtain explicitly expressed contracts for problems with Yaari's dual criterion and general RDU. Finally, we use numerical examples to compare the results between ours and that of Bernard et al. (2015) .
Introduction
Risk sharing is a method of reducing risk exposure by spreading the burden of loss among several parties. Mathematically, risk sharing can be generally formulated as a multi-optimization problem in which a Parato optimality is sought with respect to each party's well-being modelled as a preference functional. As such, a risk sharing problem falls naturally into the application domain of operations research, even though the former has not yet attracted sufficient research interest it deserves in the community of the latter.
In the context of insurance, the primary risk sharing problem is that of designing an insurance contract between an insurer and an insured that achieves Parato optimal for the two parties. Specifically, given an upfront premium that the insured pays the insurer, the problem is to determine the amount of loss I(X) covered by the insurer -called indemnity -for a random, typically nonhedgeable loss X. The premium usually includes a safety loading on top of the actuarial value of the contract in order for the insurer to have sufficient incentive to offer the contract -this is called the participation constraint of the insurer.
Optimal insurance contract design is an important problem, manifested not only in theory but also in insurance and financial practices. In the insurance literature, most of the work assume that the insurer is risk neutral 1 while the insured is a risk-averse expected utility (EU) maximizer; see e.g. Arrow (1963) , Raviv (1979) , and Gollier and Schlesinger (1996) . The problem is formulated as one that maximizes the insured's expected concave utility function of his net wealth subject to the insurer's participant constraint being satisfied. Technically, it is a constrained convex optimization problem that can be solved by standard optimization techniques. It has been shown in the aforementioned papers that the optimal contract is in general a deductible one that covers part of the loss in excess of a deductible level. This theoretical result is consistent with most of the insurance contracts available in practice. As a result, the problem is reduced to a one-dimensional optimization problem that determines the optimal deductible. Another important implication of this classical result is that the insurer and insured shares of risk are both increasing 2 functions of the risk; in other words, there is no incentive for either party to hide risk and thus there is indeed risk sharing.
1 This assumption is motivated by the fact that an insurer typically has many independent insureds as its clients, hence its risk is adequately diversified.
2 Throughout this paper, by an "increasing" function we mean a "non-decreasing" function, namely f is increasing if f (x) f (y) whenever x > y. We say f is "strictly increasing" if f (x) > f (y) whenever x > y. Similar conventions are used for "decreasing" and "strictly decreasing" functions.
However, the EU theory has received many criticisms, for it fails to explain numerous experimental observations and theoretical puzzles. For example, it fails to explain the famous Allais Paradox or the reason why a same person may buy both lottery and insurance. Other paradoxes/puzzles that EU theory cannot explain include common ratio effect (Allais, 1953 ), Friedman and Savage puzzle (Friedman and Savage, 1948) , Ellesberg paradox (Ellesberg, 1961) , and the equity premium puzzle (Mehra and Prescott, 1985) . In the context of insurance contracting, the classical EU-based models again fail to account for some behaviors in insurance demand. Sydnor (2010) investigates how people choose the deductible decisions between $100, $250, $500, and $1,000. The major finding is that the households choosing a $500 deductible pay an average premium of $715 per year, yet these households all rejected a policy with a $1,000 deductible whose average premium was just $615. Since the claim rate is about 5 percent, effectively these households were willing to pay $100 to protect against a 5 percent possibility of paying an additional $500! As explained by Barberis (2013) , this choice can only be explained by unreasonably high levels of risk aversion within the EU framework. Another insurance phenomenon that cannot be explained by the EU theory is demand for protection of small losses (e.g. demand for warranties); see Bernard et al. (2015) for a detailed discussion.
In order to overcome this drawback of the EU theory, different measures of evaluating uncertain outcomes have been put forward to depict human behaviors. A notable one is the rank-dependent utility (RDU) proposed by Quiggin (1982) . In this theory, the preference measure of a final (random)
wealth W 0 is defined as
where u : rewrite assuming that T is differentiable:
Thus, T ′ (1 − F W (x)) serves as a weight on the outcome x of W when evaluating the expected utility.
Since this weight depends on 1 − F W (x), the decumulative probability or the rank of the outcome x of W , hence the name of the rank-dependent utility. 3 In particular, if T is inverse-S shaped, that is, it is first concave and then convex; see Figure 1 , then T ′ (1 − F W (x)) > 1 when x is both sufficiently large and sufficiently small. This captures the common observation that people tend to exaggerate small probabilities of extremely good and bad outcomes (hence people buy both insurances and lotteries).
From the optimization point of view, maximizing the RDU preference (1) has a clear challenge:
with the presence of a general weighting function T , (1) is no longer concave even if u is concave.
With the development of advanced mathematical tools, the RDU preference has been applied to many areas of finance, including portfolio choice and option pricing. In particular, the approach of the so-called quantile formulation has been developed to deal with the non-convex optimization involved in solving RDU portfolio choice models (e.g. Jin and Zhou 2008, He and Zhou 2011).
The key idea is to change the decision variable from the wealth W to its quantile function, which miraculously leads to a concave optimization problem. On the other hand, Barseghyan et al. (2013) use data on households' insurance deductible decisions in auto and home insurance to demonstrate the relevance and importance of the probability weighting and suggest the possibility of generalizing their conclusions to other insurance choices.
There have been also studies in the area of insurance contract design within the RDU framework; see for example Chateauneuf, Dana and Tallon (2000), Dana and Scarsini (2007) , and Carlier and Dana (2008) . However, all these papers assume that the probability weighting function is convex. Bernard et al. (2015) are probably the first to study RDU-based insurance contracting with inverse-S shaped weighting functions, using the quantile formulation. They derive optimal contracts that not only insure large losses above a deductible level but also cover small ones. However, their results suffer from two major problems. One is the assumption that the random loss X has no atom, which is not realistic in the insurance context. The reason is that 0 is typically an atom of X, as it is plausible that P(X = 0) > 0. The second is that their contracts pose a severe problem of moral hazard, since they are not increasing with respect to the losses. As a consequence, insureds may be motivated to hide their true losses in order to obtain additional compensations; see a discussion on pp. 175-176 of Bernard et al. (2015) .
This paper aims to address these setbacks. We consider the same insurance model as in Bernard et al. (2015) , but removing the non-atomic assumption on the loss, and adding an explicit constraint that both the indemnity function and the insured's retention function (i.e. the part of the losses to be born by the insured) must be globally increasing with respect to the losses -this latter constraint will rule out completely the aforementioned behaviour of moral hazard. However, mathematically we encounter substantial difficulty. The approach used in Bernard et al. (2015) no longer works.
We develop a general approach to overcome this difficulty. Specifically, we first derive the necessary and sufficient conditions for optimal solutions via calculus of variations. While calculus of variations is a rather standard technique for infinite-dimensional optimization, 4 deducing explicitly expressed optimal contracts based on these conditions requires a fine and involved analysis. An interesting finding is that, for a good and reasonable range of parameters specifications, there are only two types of optimal contracts, one being the classical deductible one and the other a "three-fold" one covering both small and large losses.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the optimal insurance model under the RDU framework including its quantile formulation. Section 3 applies the calculus of variations to derive a general necessary and sufficient condition for optimal solutions. We then derive optimal contracts for Yaari's criterion and the general RDU in Sections 4 and 5, respectively.
Section 6 provides a numerical example to illustrate our results. Finally, we conclude with Section 7. Proofs of some lemmas are placed in an Appendix.
The Model
In this section, we present the optimal insurance contracting model in which the insured has the RDU type of preferences, followed by its quantile formulation that will facilitate deriving the solutions.
Problem formulation
We follow Bernard et al. (2015) for the problem formulation except for two critical differences, which we will highlight. Let (Ω, F, P) be a probability space. An insured, endowed with an initial wealth W 0 , faces a non-negative random loss X, possibly having atoms and supported in [0, M ], where M is a given positive scalar. He chooses an insurance contract to protect himself from the loss, by paying a premium π to the insurer in return for a compensation (or indemnity) in the case of a loss. This compensation is to be determined as a function of the loss X, denoted by I(·) throughout this paper.
The retention function R(X) := X − I(X) is thereby the part of the loss to be borne by the insured. 4 Calculus of variations has also been applied in the insurance context. For example, Spence and Zeckhauser (1971) employ calculus of variations to solve an insurance contracting problem in the setting of expected utility theory. Yong and Browne (1997) apply calculus of variations to determine equilibrium insurance policies under adverse selection within, again, the expected utility framework.
For a given X, the insured aims to choose an insurance contract that provides the best tradeoff between the premium and compensation based on his risk preference. In this paper, we consider the case when insured's preference on the final random wealth W > 0 is dictated by the RDU functional (1), where u :
On the other hand, if the insurer is risk-neutral and the cost of offering the compensation is proportional to the expectation of the indemnity, then the premium to be charged for an insurance contract should satisfy the participation constraint
where the constant ρ is the safety loading of the insurer.
It is natural to require an indemnity function to satisfy
a constraint that has been imposed in most insurance contracting literature. If the insured's preference is dictated by the classical EU theory, then the optimal contract is typically a deductible contract which automatically renders the indemnity function increasing; see e.g. Arrow (1971) and Raviv (1979) . However, for the RDU preference the resulting optimal indemnity may not be an In this paper, we require both the indemnity function and the retention function to be globally increasing. Economically speaking, this means the insurer and insured wealths are comonotone, both bearing more when a bigger loss happens. Mathematically speaking, we require
As R(x) ≡ x − I(x), it is easily seen that the joint constraint of (3) and (4) is equivalent to the following one
We can now formulate our insurance contracting problem as
where
and W 0 and π are fixed scalars.
For any random variable Y 0 a.s., define the quantile function of Y as
Note that any quantile function is nonnegative, increasing and left-continuous (ILC).
We now introduce the following assumptions that will be used hereafter. 
The first part of Assumption 2.1, crucial for the quantile formulation, is standard; see e.g. Raviv (1979) . As noted, a significant difference from Bernard et al. (2015) is that here we allow X to have
, where γ ∈ (0, 1) and η > 0. Then, X satisfies Assumption 2.1, and has an atom at 0 with the probability P(X = 0) = If the premium π
and maximizes the objective function in the problem (6) pointwisely; hence optimal. To rule out this trivial case, henceforth we restrict 0 < π < (1 + ρ)E [X] . Moreover, we assume
to ensure that the policyholder will not go bankrupt because
It is more convenient to consider the retention function R(x) = x − I(x) instead of I(x) in our study below. Letting
one can easily reformulate (6) in terms of R(·):
Quantile Formulation
The objective function in (10) is not concave in R(X) (due to the nonlinear weighting function T ), leading to a major difficulty in solving (10). However, under Assumption 2.3, we have
where the third equality is because
except for an at most countable set of z.
The above suggests that we may change the decision variable from the random variable R(X) to its quantile function F −1 R(X) , with which the objective function of (10) 
R(X)
. To this end, the next lemma plays an important role.
Lemma 2.1 Under Assumption 2.1, for any given R(·) ∈ R, we have
Proof: First, by the monotonicity of R(·), we have
It suffices to prove the reverse inequality. There are two possible cases.
• R(x) = 0. In this case, we have F −1 R(X) (F X (x)) = 0 as quantile functions are always nonnegative by definition.
• R(x) > 0. It suffices to prove that
. By the continuity and monotonicity of R(·), there exists y < x such that
where we have used the fact that F X is strictly increasing under Assumption 2.1.
The claim is thus proved.
In view of the above results, we can rewrite (10) as the following problem, in which the decision
In the absence of an explicit expression the constraint set G is hard to deal with. The following result addresses this issue. Note the major technical difficulty arises from the possible existence of the atoms of X.
Lemma 2.2 Under Assumption 2.1, we have
Proof: We denote the right hand side of (12) by
In fact, by definition,
where we have used the fact that
X (a) − ε) < a to get the last inequality. This leads to a contradiction; hence it must hold that F −1
This inequality shows that G is absolutely continuous since F
−1
X is an absolutely continuous function under Assumption 2.1. Furthermore, it also implies
To prove the reverse inclusion, take any
for any s < G(a), there exists y such that s < R(y) = G(F X (y)) < G(a) by the continuity of R(·). Then by the monotonicity of R(·) and G(·), we have
Using the same notation, a, as above, and noting that G(a) = R(a) = G(F X (a)), we have a F X (a) by the definition of a and the continuity of R(·). Moreover, it follows from
holds by monotonicity. The desired result follows.
To solve (11), we apply the Lagrange dual method to remove the constraint
and consider the following auxiliary problem:
The existence of the optimal solutions to (11) and (13) (for each given λ ∈ R + ) is established in Appendix B, while the uniqueness is straightforward when the utility function u is strictly concave.
To derive the optimal solution to (11), we first solve (13) to obtain an optimal solution, denoted by
Then we determine λ * ∈ R + by binding the constraint
is an optimal solution to (11) . Finally, an optimal solution to (10) is given by R
So our problem boils down to solving (13) . However, in doing so the convex constraint that 
Characterization of Solutions
In this section, we derive a necessary and sufficient condition for a function to be optimal to (13) .
Assume G λ (·) solves (13) with a fixed λ. Let G(·) ∈ G be arbitrary and fixed. For any ε ∈ (0, 1),
By the optimality of G λ (·) and the concavity of u, we have
Define
Then (14) yields
In other words,
Therefore, a necessary condition for G λ (·) to be optimal for (13) is
It turns out that (16) completely characterizes the optimal solutions to (13).
Theorem 3.1 A function G λ (·) is an optimal solution to (13) if and only if
satisfies (16) .
Proof: We only need to prove the "if" part. For any feasible G(·) in G, we have
Hence, G λ (·) is optimal for (13).
The above theorem establishes a general characterization result for the optimal solutions of (13).
This result, however, is only implicit as an optimal G λ (·) appears on both sides of (16) . Moreover, the derivative of G λ (z) is undetermined when N λ (z) = 0. In the next two sections, we will apply this general result to derive the solutions.
Model with Yaari's Dual Criterion
When u(x) ≡ x, the corresponding V rdu reduces to the so-called Yaari's dual criterion (Yaari 1987) .
In this section we solve our insurance problem with Yaari's criterion by applying Theorem 3.1. In this case, the condition (16) is greatly simplified.
Indeed, when u(x) ≡ x, (16) reduces to
It should be noted that although u(x) ≡ x is not strictly concave here, the uniqueness of optimal solution to (13) is implied by the characterizing condition (17) .
To apply (17), we need to compare λ and Proof: We have
and , 1) . The desired result follows.
Clearly, f (0) = 1, f (1−) = +∞. Let a be defined as in Lemma 4.1. From the proof of Lemma 4.1, it is easily seen that a is uniquely determined by
Set
Let c ∈ (a, 1] be the unique scalar such that f (c) = 1, or equivalently, T (c) = c. See Figure 1 for the locations of the points a and c. Now, we proceed by considering three cases based on the value of λ.
Case I λ λ. In this case,
It then follows from (17) that G 
Hence, (17) leads to the following function:
The corresponding retention and indemnity functions are, respectively,
and
The corresponding indemnity function is schematically illustrated by Figure 2 . Qualitatively, the insurance covers not only large losses (when z F −1
X (x 0 )), and the compensation is a constant for the median range of losses. We term such a contract a threefold one. The need for small loss coverage along with its connection to the probability weighting are amply discussed in Bernard et al. (2015) . However, in Bernard et al. (2015) the optimal indemnity is strictly decreasing in some ranges of the losses. Such a contract may incentivize the insured to hide partial losses in order to get more compensations.
In contrast, both our indemnity and retention are increasing functions of the loss, which will rule out this sort of moral hazard.
Case III 1 λ < +∞. By Lemma 4.1, there exists a unique
By (17), we have
So
This contract is a standard deductible contract in which only losses above a deductible point will be covered. DefineḠ
and let
. We are now in the position to state our main result in terms of the premium π and the indemnity function I(·). 
where ( 
where q is the unique scalar satisfying c q and
.
Proof: We note that ∆ = E[X] − π 1+ρ
and the binding constraint 
The existence of this pair follows from the condition that ∆ < K c and the definition of K c , whereas the uniqueness comes from the requirement that f (d) = f (e) and The proof is completed.
The economic interpretation of this result is clear. When the premium is small (0 π π c ), the contract only compensates large losses in excess of certain amount. When the premium is in middle
, the contract is a threefold one, covering both small and large losses.
When the premium is sufficiently large (π (1 + ρ)E[X]), it is a full coverage.
It is interesting to investigate the comparative statics of the point π c (in terms of c) that triggers the coverage for small losses. In fact, as
However,
This implies that the insurer is more willing to be protected against small losses if his weighting function has a bigger c. This is consistent with the fact that a bigger c renders a larger concave domain of the probability weighting that overweighs small losses (refer to Figure 1 ).
Model with the RDU Criterion
In this section we study the general RDU model in which the utility function is strictly concave.
Compared with the Yaari model, solving the corresponding insurance problem calls for a more delicate analysis.
For any twice differentiable function f with f ′ (x) ̸ = 0, define its Arrow-Pratt measure of absolute risk aversion
We now introduce the following assumptions. 
Assumption 5.2 (i) The function A u (z) is decreasing on (0, ∞).
( 
, which is equivalent to P(X = 0) a. In practice, P(X = 0) 0.5 is a plausible assumption for many insurance products such as automobile and house insurance. On the other hand, a is very small for many commonly used inverse-S shaped weighting functions. Take Furthermore, recall that we have proved that (13) has a unique solution when u is strictly concave and (16) provides the necessary and sufficient condition for the optimal solution.
then z a.
where the last inequality is due to Lemma A.1-(i) in Appendix A. This is a contradiction.
Lemma 5.2 Under Assumption 5.2, for any
Proof: Noting W ∆ W , it follows from Assumption 5.2 that
This leads to
where the last inequality is due to the fact that A u is decreasing and
The proof is complete.
Now, for any λ λu
′ (W ∆ ), we have
where the last inequality is due to Lemma 4.1. Hence G λ (z) = 0 ∀z ∈ [0, 1] is the only solution satisfying (16) . However,
it is possible for (16) to hold.
, we now analyze the shape of the function G λ (·) that satisfies (16) . Suppose 1) , at which N λ (z 1 ) = 0 and N λ (z) < 0 for ∀z ∈ (z 1 , 1). Next, we consider three cases respectively depending on the value of k and location of z 1 .
In this case, we have, for any z ∈ [0, 1),
It then follows from (16) 
, leading to a contradiction. So, this case in fact will not take place.
). In this situation, z 1 should be a. This is because
, which is a contradiction. So, again, this case will not occur.
). In this case, z 1 ∈ (a, 1) exists. By Lemma 5.1,
Hence, there may or may not exist z 2 ∈ (0, 1) such that N λ (z 2 ) = 0 and N λ (z) > 0 for z ∈ (z 2 , z 1 ). We now discuss four subcases depending on the existence and location of z 2 .
. Combined with the fact that G λ (0) = 0, we have:
This corresponds to a deductible contract.
Combining the property of z 1 and z 2 , we deduce
Then, using Lemma 5.2, we have
. In this case, we can express G λ (·) as follows
This is the threefold contract, schematically depicted in Figure 2 . 
contradiction. So, this case is not feasible.
where the last inequality follows from Lemma A.1-(ii) in Appendix A. This is a contradiction. So, the current case will not occur either.
To summarize, for any λ > λu ′ (W ∆ ), only deductible and threefold contracts are possibly optimal, stipulated by (C.1) and (C.2). Next, we investigate these two cases more closely.
Define a function h ∆ (·) on [a, c] as follows:
Then, by (18) and using Lemma 5.2, we have
Recalling that T (c) = c, we have
Moreover, we take the derivative of h ∆ (z) with respect to z ∈ [a, c] to obtain
Hence, there exists a unique point l ∆ ∈ (a, c) such that
The claim follows now.
then the corresponding optimal contract is not a deductible one.
Proof: There exists λ * such that G λ * (·) satisfies (16) under λ * and
Since G λ * (·) satisfies (16), we have
On the other hand,
is a continuous function, a contradiction arises.
It follows from Lemma 5.3 that, if 0 < ∆ < K ∆ , the optimal contract (which always exists) can only be a threefold one, corresponding to (C.2). We are now led to the following proposition.
Proposition 5.2 If 0 < ∆ < K ∆ , then the optimal solution to (11) is given as
Proof: The conclusion is a direct consequence of Lemma 5.3.
Note that any pair (z 2 , z 1 ) satisfying the requirements in Proposition 5.2 leads to an optimal solution to (11) . Therefore such a pair (z 2 , z 1 ) is unique as the optimal solution to (11) is unique. 
where (z 2 , z 1 ) is the unique pair satisfying z 2 a z 1 ,
where f is the unique scalar satisfying
Proof: The result follows from Propositions 5.1, 5.2 and the fact that K ∆ is a constant for any
Now, we study the case in which A u (z) is strictly decreasing. We need the following lemma.
Proof: According to definition of l ∆ 1 , we have 
Now, we are ready to give the main result in terms of the premium π and the indemnity function Then the optimal indemnity function I * (·) to the problem (6) is given as
Numerical Examples
In this section, we use numerical examples to illustrate our result with varying levels of the premium.
We take the same numerical setting as in Bernard et al. (2015) with γ = 0.02. Moreover, the safety loading of the insurer ρ is 0.2. Finally, the weighting function is
with θ = 0.5. We can verify that the assumptions of Theorem 5.4 are satisfied under this setting. In Bernard et al. (2015) , the premium is fixed at π = 3; but here we compute the optimal indemnities under π = 1.5, 3 and 4.5 respectively. These are plotted in Figure 3 . The contract corresponding to π = 1.5 is a deductible one, whereas those corresponding to the two higher premiums are threefold covering smaller as well larger losses. For the latter two contracts, the one with the higher premium covers more smaller losses and has a lower deductible. Clearly, these features are all intuitive and sensible. threefold contract, whereas theirs has a decreasing part causing potential moral hazard.
Conclusion
In this paper, we have studied an optimal insurance design problem where the insured uses the RDU preference. There are documented evidences proving that this preference captures human behaviors better than the EU preference. The main contribution of our work is that our optimal contracts are monotone with respect to losses, thereby eliminating the potential problem of moral hazard associated with the existing results.
An interesting conclusion from our results is that, under our assumptions (in particular Assump-tion 5.2-(ii)), there are only two types of non-trivial optimal contracts possible, one being the classical deductible and the other the threefold contract covering both small and large losses. Interesting questions remain regarding the consequence of this exogenous monotonicity constraint.
One of them is whether the constraint is binding. While a thorough and analytical answer requires substantial work and is certainly beyond the scope (and indeed the page limit) of this paper, some initial thoughts can be given. It turns out the assumption that the loss is non-atomic is key to the non-monotonicity of the contracts derived in Bernard et al. (2015) . This is because, under this assumption, the rank of sufficiently small losses are very close to 1, and hence there is a genuine need to fully insure a range of very small losses due to the overweighting of such small losses.
Symmetrically, a full coverage of the larger losses (beyond the deductible) is also necessary for the same reason. Now, if there is no explicit monotonicity constraint on the contract, the contract will cover less for medium losses (in order to reduce cost to meet the participation constraint) as the insured does not care about those losses as much as those on both tails. In fact, mathematically once can easily verify that the intervals of losses on which the indemnities are decreasing are non-empty in the main result, Theorem 3.9, of Bernard et al. (2015) . In other words, the monotonicity constraint imposed in this paper is always binding under the setting of Bernard et al. (2015) . Now, if 0 is the only atom of X and P (X = 0) > 0 is sufficiently small, then the same argument as above yields that the monotonicity constraint is also binding. If, on the other hand, P (X = 0) > 0 is sufficiently large so that the rank of any positive losses are sufficiently away from 1, then effectively there is no probability weighting on small losses and the insured only overweights large losses. In this case the contract will be deductible and hence automatically monotone.
A Some Lemmas
In this part, we prove some lemmas which have been used in Section 5.
convex and strictly increasing on [b, 1].
, and z 1 − z 2 are all strictly positive, we have
follows from Lemma 4.1.
For fixed x > 0, define q(z) := u ′ (x + z)u ′ (x − z) on z ∈ (0, x).
is strictly decreasing, then q(z) is a strictly increasing function on z ∈ (0, x).
Proof: We take derivative:
Hence, we get the result.
B Existence of Optimal Solutions to (11) and (13)
We first prove that the constraint set G is compact under some norm. We consider all the continuous The existence of optimal solutions to (11) and (13) can be established now. For example, for (13), let v λ (∆) be the optimal value of (13) under given λ and ∆. We can take a sequence (G n (·)) n∈N in G such that v λ (∆) = lim n↑+∞ U ∆ (λ, G n (·)). Then, according to Lemma B.1, there exists a subsequence G n k (·) converging to G * (·) in G and G * (·) is optimal solution to (13). For (11), the proof is similar.
C Existence of Lagrangian Multiplier to (11)
For the following lemma, refer to Komiya (1988) for an elementary proof. Denote by v(∆) and v(λ, ∆) be respectively the optimal values of (11) and (13).
We first prove that v(λ, ∆) is a convex function in λ for given ∆. 
The second equality comes from the fact that G * (·) is the optimal solution to (11) 
